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• Mr. Chainnan, 
PURPOSE OF THE TESTIMONY 
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify on the verification and 
compliance of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). My remarks today will focus on (1) 
the compliance decision, and (2) the compliance-judgement process. From January to 
December 1987, I was the technical lead for the State Department on the TTBT Interagency 
Work Program. I have since returned to my pennanent position as Professor of Physics at 
the California State Polytechnic University; this testimony is written in my individual 
capacity. Policy decisions always involve difficult tradeoffs between dissimilar objects, 
which is why we have elections to pick leaders with visions of the future. On the other 
hand, a compliance decision is judicial in nature and it involves different issues. As in the 
courts, we have to ask: 
(1) What did the law or the treaty say? 
(2) What is the evidence? 
(3) Is the same standard of evidence applied to both sides in a consistent manner? 
(4) Who decides that evidence is inadmissible, and that standards are consistent? 
(5)	 Does the treaty partner have an advocate, or at least a position paper, which will 
present his side, no matter how unpopular? 
• 
In my testimony, I will indicate that the compliance process in the Executive Branch has not 
always been a judicial process since the third, fourth and fifth criteria have been violated. 
When one examines the Soviet noncompliance charges against the U.S., the same 
questions can be asked of the Soviet process for detennining compliance charges. My 
intent today, is not to belabor the errors of the past, but rather -- how can we do better in 
the future. It is my belief that the process for compliance decisions must be treated 
differently than the nonnal process for policy decisions. If anus control is to have a future. 
we must develop more judicial. internal procedures to enhance the fairness of the 
compliance process. In my testimony I will offer some suggestions to improve the 
compliance process that could be considered by the next Administration (which has the 
responsibility to carry out the compliance process), the next Congress, and by the Soviet 
Union. 
I.	 COMPLIANCE WITH THE TTBT 
SUMMARY STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE: I would like to 
underscore the important conclusion of the recent Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
report, Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testin& Treaties. While at the State Department, I 
examined the relevant data from all the interagency working groups, involving both seismic 
and other data. In particular, I carried out a thorough statistical analysis of the seismic data, 
taking into account the random and systematic errors and using the accepted U. S. 
&overnment value for the bias factor. I agree with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
report of 1985 (which is cited in the OTA report) and other internal studies that the seismic 
data sets are the most meaningful for the present consideration of the past Soviet 
compliance with the TIBT. In the future, when the calibrations of the test sites are 
completed, the systematic errors in the seismic data will be reduced, and at that time the 
• 
data should be reexamined. Since all the measured yields of the largest Soviet tests fall 
within statistical uncertainties of the measurements centered at 150 kt, it appears that the 
Soviets are complying with the limit of 150 kilotons. If one applies the same standard of 
evidence to the testing programs of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., one can state that both 
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sides are complying to the TIBT within the accuracy of the measurements. Because of the 
statistical uncertainties, one can not rule out that a very few Soviet or American tests may 
have exceeded the 150 kt level by only a small amount, but when one considers the 
distribution of tests this does not constitute a violation. Thus, it is incorrect to state, as it 
does in the President's report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, that the Soviet 
nuclear tests are a "likely violation." Furthennore, virtually all of the technical people 
analyzing these data in the other agencies reached the same conclusions. Therefore, I agree 
with the OTA report on this issue which states that: 
"All of the estimates of Soviet and U.S. tests are within the 90 percent confidence level that 
one would expect if the yields were 150 kt or less. Extensive statistical studies have 
examined the distribution of estimated yields of explosions at Soviet test sites. These 
studies have concluded that the Soviets are observing a yield limit consistent with 
compliance with the 150 kt limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." (page 17) 
• 
MORE DETAILS: Because of the classified nature of the data, there will be a 
lack of numerical specificity in my testimony. In this particular compliance case, this is 
unfortunate because there is no military significance in the slightly more accurate, classified 
sesimic magnitude values, and the agreed U.S. government value for the bias factor. In 
other words, this discussion would be enhanced if we could lay the data out on the table 
and discuss it There are two main errors that one must consider when analyzing the data, 
random errors which give a fluctuating value of measurement about a central value, and 
systematic errors, such as a zero set on a scale. Publicly, the U.S. government has stated 
that the present seismic technology is within a factor of about two (F=2). This means that 
95% of the explosions at exactly 150 kilotons (kt) would measure between 2x150 (2F), or 
300 kt, and 150/2 (F/2), or 75 kt. Alternatively, this means that 1 event in 40 would 
appear above 300 kt ifF=2. The OTA report states that all of the Soviet and U.S. tests are 
within (or below) the F=2 criteria. I agree, and so does everyone else in the "process" that 
the events are considerably below the 150x2=300 kiloton limit. Thus, if one is to claim 
noncompliance, one must assert one of the following: 
ERRORS IN THE BIAS FACTOR. The relative difference between the 
seismic signals from the Nevada and Semipalatinsk test sites is call the bias factor. The 
bias factor has not yet been directly measured by the United States Government. At this 
time, interagency task forces have examined the indirect determinations of the bias factor, 
and given their interpretation of the data, which was ultimately accepted by the Executive 
Branch process l . More direct measurements of the bias factor could ultimately come from 
further Joint Verification Experiments. By ignoring the systematic error in the bias factor, 
one can make the old (uncalibrated, no Lg data) seismic data appear to be much more 
accurate than it really is by considerably rcilucing the apparent F factor. By avoiding the 
systematic error, one in effect pushes some of the events beyond the upper limit (2F) 
because F is smaller. Some have incorrectly argued that the error on the bias factor, as 
adopted by the Executive Branch, is a political decision, and that the political process, hx 
definition, does not make an error in its judgements. But we all know, that both scientific 
measurements and political decisions have eOVrs, and we must take them into account To 
ignore the systematic error in the bias, at this time without calibration, is to make a very 
large error in one's analysis. 
NONSEISMIC DATA ON SOVIET TESTS: If the argument for 
noncompliance cannot rest on the seismic data (as indicated above), then it must depend on 
other, nonseismic data. The OTA report references a letter2 from Dr. Roger Batzel,
• 
Director of the Lawrence-Livennore National Laboratory to Senator Pell, Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (February 23, 1987): 
2
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"We have considered the non-seismic evidence as well as the seismic evidence. Our 
conclusion, like that of the DIA panel which also reviewed all the data, is that the seismic 
evidence is currently the most reliable basis for estimating the yields of Soviet underground 
nuclear explosions. We continue to attempt to reconcile the available data. However, we 
believe that the interpretation of the past Soviet test program which is the most consistent 
with the best available data is that: The Soviets appear to have obeyed a testing limit. The 
limit is consistent with compliance with the provisions of the TTBT. The uncertainties of 
the yield estimation process are such that we cannot rule out the possibility that a few of the 
tests could have exceeded the threshold. These uncertainties are, in part, the source of the 
differences in the assessments of the extent of Soviet compliance with the TTBT. On-site 
hydrodynamic yield measurements would help to reduce the uncertainties and improve 
confidence in the results of the compliance evaluation process." 
From what I know about the data, the Livermore and OTA conclusions are correct. 
I have done independent calculations on the compliance and calibration data. I have 
participated in the groups that analyzed the non-seismic data. I have sPent a considerable 
amount of time with scientists, at the working level, on all of these technical issues. From 
my work and these discussions, I find a great unanimity among the scientists on the 
conclusions on compliance by OTA and LLNL. On the other hand, I take a great exception 
to the Executive Branch testimony3 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 
28, 1988 that "Furthermore, the totality of evidence strengthens the previous finding of 
TIBTlikely T  violation." This statement implies that the nonseismic data were good enough 
to prove the case, which is in disagreement with the DIA and other reports. 
• 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMLIANCE WITH 
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. The most recent report4 to the Congress on the 
Soviet noncompliance on the TIBT stated that: 
"While. in view of ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and in view of 
verification uncertainties, the available evidence is ambiguous and we have been unable to 
reach a definitive conclusion. this evidence indicates, that Soviet nuclear-testing activities 
for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the TIBT." 
(emphasis added) 
According to Webster's Dictionary, a "likely" event is one which is "probably 
destined to happen or be." Thus a likely event must be much more probable than a "not­-
likely event." The concluding charge of "likely violation" in this sentence does not 
logically follow from the preamble portions of the sentence. One can only conclude that the 
Executive Branch must have been split over the issue, and that the National Security 
Council attempted to patch the disagreement together. 
WHY HAS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH MAINTAINED THE 
CHARGE OF "LIKELY VIOLATION?" The original charge of noncompliance on 
the TIBT was released to the Congress on January 23, 1984. According to Duffyl, "In 
January 1986, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey reportedly changed the CIA 
procedures for estimating the yields of large Soviet tests to conform to the 
recommendations of review panels." In other words, the value of the bias factor was 
increased, and the case of "noncompliance" was severely weakened. In December 1985 
President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 202, requesting a review of 
how the methodological changes would affect the past U.S. charges of Soviet violations." 
• 
In my view, some members of the Executive Branch felt that they were locked-in to 
continue the charge of "likely violation" because of the great inertia of history. In 1984, 
TIBTthe U.S. made the charge of noncompliance on a number of issues, such as T  and the 
Krasnoyarsk radar. In 1986, the charge of noncompliance with the TTBT was greatly 
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weakened by the change of the bias factor. but, of course. the Krasnoyarsk radar continues 
to be a violation. no one disputes that. (The military significance of Krasnoyarsk at this 
time is essentially nil. but it still is a violation until it is torn down.) Many observers think 
that the compliance process can be used as a tool to send the Soviets a message that we are, 
in general, unhappy with their behavior, and that to backtrack on the UBT compliance 
issue would be to send the wrong messaG. There may be some truth in this argument, but 
the broader question is "should one use any means to obtain one's ends, and will it be 
counterproductive?" Most of us would be discouraged if the justice system of our country 
was used to accomplish goals beyond the original allegations. In my testimony I maintain 
that the "compliance-judgement process" must be held to the same general standards on 
which our country's judicial system is based. My conclusion is that the "likely violation" 
charge would not be made now, except for the momentum of the past noncompliance 
charge. 
• 
HOW MUCH VERIFICATION IS ENOUGH? A SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS OF THE THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY DUE TO A 
BREAKOUT FROM THE TTBT: Five years ago, I publisheds a variational 
calculation on the survivability of U.S. strategic forces if the Soviets improved their 
weapons in a variety of ways. These calculations were based on the unclassified data sets 
from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. My results showed that the 
survival of U.S. forces was mu~h less sensitive to increases in the Yield parameter than to 
improvements in the accuracy {CEP) and reliability. Many other authors have obtained 
similar results. While in the Executive Branch, I carried out similar calculations using the 
real data on computerized exchange models. These results confirmed the above conclusion 
that variations in yield were much, much less important than variations in accuracy or 
reliability. The policy process should examine these kinds of effects when considering 
verification technologies. 
II. THE COMPLIANCE-JUDGEMENT PROCESS 
HOW CAN THE INTERAGENCY COMPLIANCE PROCESS BE 
IMPROVED? A PROPOSAL FOR THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS. The last 
part of my testimony is not based on science, but rather, it is intended as a provocative 
suggestion in order to have us focus on the improvement of the compliance process. In my 
view the compliance process would be improved if the Executive Branch adopted more 
judicial procedures for the compliance process. As one examines the Soviet charges of 
U.S. noncompliance, it rapidly becomes clear that many of their charges can be dismissed 
without seeing the data. For example, the deplOYment of Pershing Two missiles was not a 
violation of SALT, and so forth. Thus, my suggestions (rather than criticisms) are relevant 
to both sides, and, in my view, one shouldn't belabor the fact of which side was more 
illogical. Let us admit that we both can improve, and leave it at that. Within this spirit, I 
offer the following three possible rules of conduct for compliance deliberations in the 
United States and in the Soviet Union in order to carry out the criteria 3 to 5, listed in the 
first paragraph of this testimony: 
-- The same standard of evidence shall apply when considering (1) U.S. charges of 
Soviet noncompliance and (2) U.S. compliance with the same treaties. We should 
encourage the Soviets also - to apply the same standards for the two situations that 
they face. 
• 
-- The interagency group as a whole shall rule on the validity of the standards of 
evidence used, with disagreements directly appealable to the National Security Council. 
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-- The treaty partner, which is not in attendance to present its views, shall be 
represented by either an interagency paper representing their views, or preferably by an 
experienced advocate, appointed by the President or his designate. It is the responsibility 
of the advocate, or position paper to argue against unreasonable positions and ask hard 
questions of the other agencies. This process could encourage the Executive Branch to ask 
their treaty partners additional questions which might, or might not, clairfy the situation~
We should encourage the Secretary General to appoint an "American Advocate" to the 
Soviet internal compliance proceedings. 
CAN THESE RULES BE IMPLEMENTED? No matter which party 
controls the Executive Branch, it is unlikely that the Executive Branch will want to consider 
fonnalizing their compliance-judgement process for fear of infringement by the Congress 
on their national security process. It is very unlikely that the Congress can dictate the 
details of the classified, national-security process. However, the Congress could require 
the Executive Branch to study these rules of fairness, consider other improved procedures, 
and examine the possibility of their implementation. Without some action along these lines 
some of the problems will continue, such as: 
(1) In the past, two different standards have been used, on at least two occasions, which 
required a higher standard from the Soviets, than from the U.S. A judicial process 
demands the same standard. 
(2) Because the 6 agencies in the compliance process don't wish to be viewed as too 
favorable toward the Soviets, it becomes somewhat difficult to combat unreasonableness 
and ask the hard questions. 
• 
(3) When there are many issues at the interagency process, defending due process for the 
Soviets becomes expendable. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I will gladly answer questions you have. 
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